@article {11,
	title = {On self selection of the corrupt into the public sector},
	journal = {Economic Letters},
	volume = {127},
	year = {2015},
	pages = {43-46},
	abstract = {Do corrupt people self select themselves in professions where the scope of corruption is high? We conduct a corruption experiment with private sector job aspirants and aspirants of Indian bureaucracy. The game models embezzlement of resources in which {\textquotedblleft}supervisors{\textquotedblright} evaluate the performance of {\textquotedblleft}workers{\textquotedblright} and then pay them. We find that aspirant bureaucrats indulge in more corruption than private sector aspirants but the likelihood of being corrupt is same across two sectors.},
	url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176514004819},
	author = {Ritwik Banerjee and Tushi Baul and Tanya Rosenblat}
}
