<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="7.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Ritwik Banerjee</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tushi Baul</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Tanya Rosenblat</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">On self selection of the corrupt into the public sector</style></title><secondary-title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Economic Letters</style></secondary-title></titles><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2015</style></year></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176514004819</style></url></web-urls></urls><volume><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">127</style></volume><pages><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">43-46</style></pages><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Do corrupt people self select themselves in professions where the scope of corruption is high? We conduct a corruption experiment with private sector job aspirants and aspirants of Indian bureaucracy. The game models embezzlement of resources in which “supervisors” evaluate the performance of “workers” and then pay them. We find that aspirant bureaucrats indulge in more corruption than private sector aspirants but the likelihood of being corrupt is same across two sectors.</style></abstract></record></records></xml>